Invisible hand of morality

I enjoyed writing my MINT column for Tuesday on the rise of socialism among millennials and how capitalism – both ‘arms-length’ and ‘arms-around’ varieties – brought about this love for socialism. The MINT column was triggered by ‘The Economist’ cover (16th February 2019) and the ‘leader’ on the topic. While researching for the topic, I came across a paper by Amar Bhide titled, ‘An accident waiting to happen’ written in 2009. It is a well-written paper – both cogently and passinately argued.

In my MINT column, I argue that both arms-length capitalism and relationship capitalism (citing an example from India) had failed and the common reason for that failure is that morality has disappeared from both forms of capitalism. The common belief stemming from a faulty reading of Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’ was that morality was not required. Self-interest was both necessary and sufficient to drive collectively beneficial outcomes. It is quite possible that Adam Smith never meant it that way. I had covered that in an earlier blog post. The visible hand of morality was the foundation or pillar of capitalism. My argument and Amar Bhide’s arguments are not mutually exclusive.

In his paper, Amar Bhide argues that the crisis of 2008 was a case of humans lacking in humility (excessive belief in mathematically determined probabilities) and failing to factor in the law of unintended consequences. He argues that tight securities market regulations (investor protection laws; insider trading rules, etc.,) created arms-length capital markets in which nobody had a stake and hence, managers looked after themselves. No single shareholder was powerful enough or interested enough to stop excesses of managements.

Similarly banking or financial deregulation, he says, enabled banks to take on risks that they otherwise would not have. He cites abolition of inter-state banking, repeal of Glass-Steagall, proprietary trading, etc. Federal Deposit Insurance encouraged banks’ excessive risk-taking: moral hazard. Ho brw come economists ignored moral hazard in this matter? With deposit insurance, depositors were not interested in monitoring risk-taking by banks.

He writes:

In the narrative offered by Rajan and several other economists, exogenous technologies played a deterministic role, inexorably forcing changes in regulation and financing arrangements. But technology might, instead, have facilitated relationship banking…. The outcome was not predetermined. In fact, in the story that I have told here, the increased share of securitized financial assets was driven mainly by the beliefs of financial economists and regulators. [Link]

His conclusion is pithy, sharp and correct:

Economics has underpinned securitization through its embrace of mathematical models to the exclusion of other perspectives, and through a complementary tendency to ignore the downside of liquidity and arms-length relationships. Regulation has brought this way of thinking into the world of practice in two paradoxically related streams: by increasing the scope and effectiveness of the New Deal securities acts and subsequent rules that fostered the growth of arms-length transactions in corporate control; and the progressive dilution of New Deal banking acts, which nurtured and protected long term relationships. This is the complicated story that may explain why developments in mortgage banking, of all things—traditionally the plodding, conservative bread-and-butter of depository banking—should have led to the implosion of the world economy.

I also chanced upon two of his op.-eds. One calls for the end of the Federal Reserve (as we know it) and the other faults the IMF for encouraging reckless lending by banks in foreign currencies to emerging sovereigns. Who, in their senses, could disagree with his (and his co-author’s) arguments?

Notwithstanding all of these, I could not resist pointing out in my column that the love of socialism is misguided and that humans were once again falling back on lazy answers. In this regard, the article I had cited in my MINT column on the case for wearing fur and leather was very thoughtful. The costs imposed on societies by misguided and/or uninformed do-gooders are substantial. I encourage you to read it.

I would also like to recommend reading a blog post I had written little less than six months ago.

Everybody talks inequality

Raghuram Rajan has a piece in ‘Project Syndicate’ in which he echoes Paul Tucker on central bankers but stops of advising them to not to go to Davos, as Paul Tucker did. In any case, if this FT story is true, there won’t be much tears shed. How times have changed?!

An extract from Raghuram Rajan’s article on central bankers:

And, of all elites, central bankers seem to have the most strikes against them. Most have doctorates and speak in a language that nobody else understands. The quintessential “citizens of nowhere,” they meet periodically behind closed doors in faraway Basel, where they discuss global financial conditions and the systemic effects of monetary policies. What they do not talk about, many believe, is Main Street, except when it factors into discussions about inflation.

No wonder there has been such a decline in public trust. It is bad enough when average citizens can scarcely understand the complicated tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. It is worse when one adds in public grievances over Wall Street bailouts and the perception that central bankers are focused on global conditions instead of domestic concerns. Yes, it is every central banker’s job to think about such things; but that job is increasingly being met with suspicion by those who aren’t in the room. [Link]

Overall, the piece tries to cover too many grounds and offers too little by way of answers. His piece, however, triggered my interest in the inequality topic and I re-hashed some of the recent pieces I had read in the last twelve months or little longer. The links are here:

https://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/11/06/how-the-rich-rig-regulations/

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/upshot/income-inequality-united-states.html

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/business/world-inequality.html

https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/sMRTHlLePT4cfXTkjM7JOM/Angus-Deaton–How-inequality-works.html

I had blogged on the topic here and I think that remains an answer!

Bolsonaro should beware the asymmetry

This story in Bloomberg on the new Brazilian President’s plans to relax the country’s strict gun-control laws reminded me of the note I had written with my friend and co-author Gulzar Natarajan on asymmetry in economics and in public policy.

His claim is that the country’s strict gun-control laws have not really ended violent crimes. May be. But, relaxing them might well raise them substantially. That is the asymmetry that he should be mindful of.

Cost of rural services

While newspaper reports talk of rural and agrarian distress in India, India’s statistical organisation produced a monthly CPI report for December 2018 in which rural healthcare and education costs jumped sharply higher. Headline inflation rate: 2.2%. Core inflation rate: 5.7%. Rural healthcare inflation: 9.0% and rural education inflation: 8.4%. That defies explanation. SBI Chief Economist wrote:

The most puzzling aspect of the inflation data is the increase in rural health and education inflation at the time when rural demand is collapsing. A deep analysis of this completely contrarian behavior is warranted, however, as of now it seems that it could be a combination of methodological changes in data collection and implementation of Aayushman Bharat  Scheme which might have led to an upgradation of health services at least in rural areas. However, even then the jump in healthcare costs is happening mostly because of jump in medicine costs from non-institutional sources, that begs explanation.  Another baffling aspect is the jump in education inflation in rural areas. Clearly, the CSO should clarify the doubts of such a significant increase in service costs in rural areas since October 2018. Is it a data error? We don’t know yet. 

With such data collection and lack of proper statistical and seasonal adjustments, it may not be possible to make sound public policy. Bad data can and do beget bad policy.

Keynes and Krugman

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct economist. [Link]

Most people who know of Keynes and economics would have heard of or read the above quote.

But, these days, it has been more appropriate to reword it the other way around: most economists are usually slaves of some defunct political ideology. Or, they disgrace themselves by allowing themselves to be enslaved by some defunct political ideology or policy idea.

Krugman defending Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’ proposal for a 70% top marginal tax rate in an indefensible manner is an example of that.

That forms the subject matter of my MINT column tomorrow.

Independence and interdependence

What follows are verbatim extracts from a speech delivered by Dr. Y.V. Reddy at a conference held in Patna nearly a month ago on public finance:

In brief, the three policies like all other policies have an over-arching objective of welfare with each policy having its own defined set of objectives and appropriate operating instruments to achieve the specified objectives.  It is believed that one of the contributing factors to Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is underestimating the inter-dependence of these policies, and over-emphasising their independence. 

[The three policies he is referring to are fiscal, monetary and regulatory]

Exclusive focus of monetary policy on price stability had its pitfalls.  It has become clear that financial stability considerations, in particular, the asset prices, cannot be ignored.  The possibility of excess liquidity provided by the monetary authorities for a prolonged period impacting the excesses in finance is noted. 

The assumption that financial markets correct themselves and have a benign influence on growth is questioned.  The incentive mechanisms in the financial institutions and the possibility of excessive financialisation in the financial markets are recognised. 

[In the paragraphs above, he is pointing to the lessons learnt from the crisis of 2008. I guess, they are lessons that ought to have been learnt but not quite learnt]

As regards monetary policy, RBI rejected inflation targetting and single objective, unequivocally.  It did not share the enthusiasm for capital account convertibility and decided to manage impossible trinity.

[That is a nice summary of the policy framework of RBI under his leadership]

While concerted action was possible for strengthening the private sector banking system, the regulatory actions of a prudential and counter-cyclical nature by the RBI were undertaken despite some resistance from government and financial markets. 

[He is rather understated here, on the tensions that existed between RBI and the Government of India in 2006-08 on the regulation of the financial sector]

The objectives of monetary policy in India continued to be price stability or credit for productive activities, depending on the context.  Inflation targeting was not adopted in India. Dominance of banking, in particular, public sector continued though presence of private sector increased.  There was a cautious deregulation of the banking sector.  Counter-cyclical prudential policies were followed, and capital account was managed.

[That is an excellent summary of the differences in the global ‘best practice’ (?) and Indian policy framework between 1993 and 2008. After 2008, the world has copied some of the above practices.]

A common thread in all these arrangements is that they were intra public sector transactions that were transparent and strengthened effectiveness of public policy.  All of them strengthened the balance sheet of RBI to enable it to serve the economy and government. 

[He is referring to the various arrangements put in place between the GoI and RBI on management of foreign exchange reserves, sterilisation costs, on the guarantees that RBI had extended on foreign exchange losses, etc. Indirectly, he is hinting that the current differences could have been handled if there was recognition that these were ‘intra public sector transactions’]

Government continues to be a privileged owner of enterprises in the financial sector – thus constraining the regulator’s effectiveness. 

He is right to reiterate his reservations on the Government ownership of the banking system inasmuch as it adversely affects RBI’s regulation of these banks. He endorses Urjit Patel’s comments in this regard.

The overall thinking in Government about reforms changed from the moment Raghuram Rajan Committee gave its recommendations in 2008; and Justice Sri Krishna Committee gave its report in 2010.  The influence of RBI on the general thinking on reforms changed and a new framework took its place.

[In the above comments, he leaves more unstated than state them. Justice Sri Krishna Committee’s recommendations were made in 2013, I think. I think Dr. Reddy is referring to the recommendations of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission. Or, it could be another Committee.]

The government by virtue of its role as a coordinator and at the same time as the owner of the regulated entities puts / makes the central bank and the regulators somewhat ineffective unless they are on the same wave length as the government. The financial intermediaries in banking, insurance and even non banking mutual funds, etc. continue to be dominated by the presence of public sector.  Hence, the regulators’ standard tools are ineffective. 

[A rather forthright comment by the former Governor. The votaries of public sector banking in the present ruling dispensation must take note of these observations.]

Under the new regime, the financial stability considerations are not explicitly taken into account. In regard to external sector also, the stability considerations are not explicitly built into the monetary policy objectives. Is there a danger that the advantages of in-built coordination available in full service central bank been foregone?  Is there an identity crisis because of the juxtaposition of the MPC in a full service central bank? 

[Dr. Y.V. Reddy has raised some very important questions here on the monetary policy framework, on the government-RBI relations, etc.]

The effectiveness of “independent” monetary policy is blunted by the criticality of government owned banks for transmission of monetary policy.

[In a sense, he is highlighting the incompatibility of independent monetary policy and government-ownership of the banking system]

The regulatory framework of banks is not neutral to ownership in the sense that governance of public sector banks continues to be determined by the government.  The fiscal authorities use the banking system to implement some of the government developmental programs and RBI as a regulator does facilitate the use of public deposits with the banks for pursuing governmental programs. 

[Dr. Reddy again reminds us of the complexity that the RBI has to deal with, given government’s ownership of the banking system and its fiscal and development imperatives.]

This speech is not yet uploaded on his website. Once uploaded, you will find it here.

Travesty

A friend sent me this tweet of Shri. Rahul Gandhi and asked me for comments:

Here is my response:

Travesty.
 
Congress, under PVN, built India’s growth story on a set of policy proposals that were prepared before PVN took office.
 
Congress, in the 1950s, did not do a bad job. India’s growth was comparable.
 
Congress, in the Sixties and in the Seventies screwed up India big time, barring a year or two in between.
 
The war with China in itself was a colossal policy failure.
 
On the positive side, Indira Gandhi’s ‘Green Revolution’ was a good example. Her overture to Ronald Reagan on inviting American technology companies to set up shop in India opened the way for I.T revolution. But, her negatives far outweighted the one or two good initiatives – undermining of institutions, institutionalising corruption, reversal of Federalism, etc.
 
Congress in the 1980s – Mrs. Gandhi, on her return, did a decent job from 1980 to 1982 – initiated economic liberalisation. R. Venkatraman played an important role in that period, as the Finance Minister. Tried to weaken the iron grip of the State on the country. She lost her way from 1983 to 1984.
 
Rajiv Gandhi meant well and did a few good things from 1985 to 1987. Telecom revolution should be credited to him. Initiated de-licensing by allowing broadbanding of licenses; But, lasted only two years. Lost his way from 1987 until 1989.
 
So, out of the 67 years up to 2014, the Congress ruled for 54 years (not counting the United Front coalition years). Out of those, it provided decent governance (only) in some areas for about fifteen to sixteen years. These fifty four years include the five-year term of PVN Rao.
 
From 2004 to 2008, the Congress Party did not contribute to India’s economic growth. It rode the global growth wave and India’s growth was aided by an unsustainble investment boom facilitated by equally unsustainable capital inflows. These investments were largely unproductive too.
 
From 2009 to 2014, the costs of the unsustainable growth of the previous five years became manifest. They are still being felt and incurred by the country. Double-digit inflation and the collapse of the Indian rupee are but two of the testimonies.  Tax terrorism started from the budget of 2012-13 (and, unfortunately, has continued under this government, with greater vigour).
 
From 2014 to 2018, India suffered monsoon failures and global growth slowdown. India had to use the bonanza from the crude oil price crash to repair the country’s finances, left in utter disrepair by the previous government.
 
Demonetisation was not thought through thoroughly and implemented badly. Yet, it is possible that its long-run benefits outweigh the costs. Goods and Services Tax will surely be a long-run success story as is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy framework. Short-term glitches are inevitable in a big country such as this and some of the glitches are due to external technology support from private sector.
 
Formalisation of the Indian economy is sorely needed. This government has made crucial beginnings – in many important ways – in this largely unpopular task. 
 
The development of the Northeastern region of the country and its integration with the rest of the nation will have huge long-run dividends. For example, the recently completed bridge in Assam was 21 years in the making. In the first seventeen years, there was scarcely any progress on its construction!
 
In sum, based on track record, incompetence is a charge more easily attached to the leadership of the previous UPA government. There is empirical evidence.