Looking beyond Urjit Patel

Niranjan Rajadhyaksha feels that RBI’s independence from the government is worth preserving as, otherwise, it might return India to the days of directed credit, outright deficit monetisation, etc. That is his broader concern. I think his fear is legitimate.

Given that, he is more inclined to overlook RBI’s failings and turn a harsh spotlight on the government. He is right, given the line in the sand that he has drawn. I must say that if RBI headed in that direction under the new Governor, it would not be progress but regression.

But, should that come in the way of judging Urjit Patel’s tenure? Niranjan feels Urjit Patel stared down the government on more than one occasion. That may be right but a narrow consideration, in my view. I had commented on it when that happened.

He credits Urjit Patel with stabilising the inflation mandate and the new Monetary Policy Committee arrangement. R. Jagannathan of ‘Swarajya’ has different and more valid views on them. See below.

But,  there is yet another broader issue and that is one of consumer interest.  I have long opposed the formation of appellate tribunals to contest policy decisions of RBI. There is judicial redress. But, on consumer matters, perhaps, is there a need for a higher authority, above RBI, since RBI seems intent on protecting banks rather than consumer? Read Monika Halan here. I hope readers will remember the blog post I wrote on November 27 where I had linked a piece by Debashis Basu in ‘Business Standard’. Debashis Basu’s piece is well worth a read. Monika Halan links to another piece by him in her op.-ed cited above.

I have heard this from some friends who had worked for other regulators that RBI operates more as a ‘Don’ who protects his men (banks, here) rather than as a neutral regulator of the entities that come under its watch.

More narrowly, specifically with respect to Urjit Patel, R. Jagannathan minces no words in evaluating his tenure. He sheds no tears and he makes equally valid points too. Inflation forecasting failures and the consequent needlessly tight monetary policy – based on a doctrinaire adherence to their inflation targeting mandate – come under deservedly harsh scrutiny from him.

If we are keen on preserving institutions that have stood the time, as RBI undoubtedly has, we should also not hesitate to call out its mistakes and its shortcomings. No one is above or can be above criticism.  If the survival and the thriving of an institution is in national interest, then we will be failing the institution if we don’t hold it to a higher standard.

In my previous blog post on this topic, I had mentioned clearly what RBI has to do on its part. As for the government, in this blog post, I had mentioned what the Government should do, with respect to RBI.

On inflation targeting, if the new Governor revisits the 4% mid-point and redefines the range around it making it asymmetric, I will support it. See here for my column on whether inflation is really a matter for monetary policy and, see here for my views on the inflation targeting framework in India.

Lastly, I do not have a view on Mr. Shaktikanta Das. I do not wish to pre-judge him. Let us wait. What is the rush?

Natural enemies and man-made enemies

It is my piece in MINT on Tuesday. I enjoyed writing this but it was also one of the most difficult pieces to write. I spent several hours on it. But, the end result is gratifying.

A few weeks ago, I saw a news story that the eco-sensitive zone around the Bannerghatta National Park would be reduced by 100 sq km. This news was covered in a small way in the national newspapers. Since then, a campaign has been mounted to prevent this proposed reduction from happening. This story reminded me of an interaction with Meghna Krishnadas of Yale University early in November.

In the paper Weaker Plant-enemy Interactions Decrease Tree Seedling Diversity With Edge-effects In A Fragmented Tropical Forest, written with Robert Bagchi, Sachin Sridhara and Liza S. Comita (Nature Communications, Vol. (9), article number: 4523 (2018)), she tested the hypothesis that natural enemies—insect herbivores and fungal pathogens—help shape plant diversity, especially in the context of forest fragmentation. These enemy effects or their absence are more pronounced in forest edges than in the interiors.

In plain English, if some plants are not regulated by natural enemies, they will tend to grow unregulated and uninhibited. That would reduce plant diversity. So, applying pesticides and destroying insect herbivores and fungal pathogens destroy plant diversity too. In other words, the fragile balance between humans and nature has to be nurtured carefully. If we don’t, we will not be able to sustain biodiversity, especially in fragmented forests. That is why the decision to reduce the eco-sensitive zone around the Bannerghatta National Park deserves the scrutiny it is getting.

Many people feel that there is a trade-off between short-term economic growth imperatives and the need to preserve the ecology and environment. Western countries could burn hydrocarbons without a worry when they were developing countries. Developing countries have to be mindful of carbon emission and their commitments to international climate accords.

However, these commitments are not merely a case of being good global citizens. They are necessary even to maintain the health of local citizens. Without a healthy population, there is no sustained economic growth. So, sometimes, these trade-offs are more imagined than real.

The fragile balance between nature and humans was also the subject matter of the recently released Rajinikanth-starrer 2.0. After having feted technology in his earlier films, director Shankar reminds himself and his audience that technology and seeming technological progress are, more often than not, only mixed blessings. The message to be sensitive to the need for the winged population to survive is neither a luxury nor a concern of developed societies. The movie reminds the audience that by preying on insects and worms, birds maintain plant health and obviate the need for the application of pesticides.

Juxtaposing the message of the paper with the message of the movie gives us a beautiful insight. Birds are natural enemies for insects and worms. Without birds, we will have too much of them. Without them, we will have too little plant diversity. Nature has arranged itself well.

We do not understand it and frown upon any effort required to preserve its fragile balance as a hindrance. We clothe our laziness and our short-termism in intellectual terms, arguing that economic growth and poverty alleviation require relegating environmental considerations to the background. We do so at our own peril.

We cast our interference with and trampling upon natural arrangements as the triumph of human intellect. I view them with trepidation. For example, Financial Times featured an article recently on embryo selection (Profiling For IQ Opens New Uber-parenting Possibilities, 22 November 2018). The article briefly mentions personal and social costs of such embryo selection without going into details. It is fraught with immense danger.

It will be polarising at a social level. It will add yet another dimension of inequality to the ones we know. At a personal level, it will add immense stress as competition will be intense among the so-called “super kids” of which there will be plenty. There is a reason for nature’s bell curve distribution of many things. Consequences of extremely thick fat tails are unknown unknowns.

Indian cricketer Cheteshwar Pujara had said, “When you start playing shots [during a testing spell], that means your game is not capable enough to play the Test format. You are trying to survive rather than understand the situation and play accordingly.” He is right. When someone wishes to rush through a situation that requires deliberation, they are fearful and doubtful of their staying power. That is how humans are reacting to the complexities of the world, some of which may be self-inflicted. When Seth Klarman told the audience at Harvard Business School in October that one of society’s most vexing problems was its relentless short-term orientation, he was echoing Pujara. Short-termism betrays lack of confidence in long-term staying power.

Finally, the conclusion that natural enemies are useful for biodiversity is readily transferable to societies. Natural enemies are useful for diversity of opinions and ideas. So, the more we shut down opposite views (enemies), the less intellectually vibrant the society becomes. Just as biodiversity is beneficial, diversity of views is also beneficial. For that, one needs natural enemies. Therefore, common sense and self-interest dictate that we don’t smother natural enemies.

V. Anantha Nageswaran is the dean of IFMR Graduate School of Business (KREA University). These are his personal views.

Comment are welcome at views@livemint.com

A dispassionate look at RBI revaluation reserves and other demands of GoI

On November 19, the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of India met and agreed to constitute an expert committee to determine the appropriate level of economic capital that the central bank must hold. So, now, all of us have the time to evaluate the issue more objectively.

Niranjan Rajadhyaksha (former Senior Editor at MINT and a good friend) wrote a column in MINT which basically gave the following message:

  1. The equity plus contingency reserves have hardly increased
  2. Revaluation reserves have reflected growing FX holdings
  3. Comparisons with other countries is really not useful unless we understand the specific institutional arrangements.
  4. The government has really not given us a solid argument other than RBI has more capital as a proportion of BS than other CBs.

Few days later, just on the day of the RBI Board Meeting, MINT published an excellent interview with economist Indira Rajaraman. 

She said the following:

I think in a lot of what RBI does, there is this sense—I am not attributing it to the present governor—an institutional sense that there are things that have to be done in public interest which the public cannot quite comprehend. That has to go. I think there has to be a sense that the public can understand if they are made to understand.

The questions that North Block is raising exhibit a fairly nuanced understanding of a number of issues. Let’s say the 12 issues that were raised by the government in the three letters to RBI. I was quite surprised at the depth of understanding in North Block of the various issues and in particular on the reserves issue. I think it was time the question was asked and RBI was made to defend its particular level of reserves.

Mr. Malegam, who is considered a high priest on the reserves issue as he has been on the board for so many years and has chaired a couple of committees on it, has said that under Article 58 of the RBI Act, there is no provision for transfer of reserves to the government. I do not agree with him there.

Yes; of course, in Article 58, there is no explicit provision for transfer of reserves, but then again, there is no provision that reserves must not be transferred. There are a lot of things unsaid in the legislation and for the government to have identified that hole and to say that there is possibility of transfer and tell us why you cannot transfer. 

In addition, there have been many regulatory lapses during the last year which have led to a sense among the ministry of finance and educated watchers that the regulatory plumbing needs to be overhauled.

For instance, the RBI annual report is a submission of the board of RBI to the ministry of finance and not of the RBI management to the ministry of finance as was the general impression.

The annual report used to be placed in the draft form for a 15-minute examination by the board before it was pulled away for finalization. I used to speak up and tell my board members that this is going from us and we should read this. In the four years, I was probably the only one who insisted on a draft and having a video link with RBI in Mumbai with my comments on every page of the draft.

I am sure I was considered a nuisance but I took my responsibilities seriously as a board member of RBI and wanted that the annual report should be accurate portrayal of RBI’s functioning.

The board for a long time was not aware of its powers. In a certain sense, this confrontation has brought to the fore the role of the board, its powers and responsibilities and made the management more aware that they are accountable.

RBI has to engage as its actions impinge on everyone in the country. There has to be more transparency and more willingness to talk to people who do not understand the intricacies but are still in need of an explanation.

I don’t think they are just motivated by the fiscal concern. There is the liquidity concern also which could be termed as in the public interest.

The important thing is that RBI has to look into each issue on its merit.

For instance, on the liquidity issue, the government asking for a calculation of the liquidity squeeze, or asking why does the central bank think that liquidity is adequate; I think the ministry of finance is perfectly justified in it. [Link]

Given her intellectual depth and breadth of experience, her own previous association with RBI and her final wish for this institution to be nourished and cherished lend her criticism of RBI a far greater authenticity and credibility than that of the many unthinking, reflexive defences of RBI.

Revaluation Reserves:

Revaluation Reserves are gains accruing from the rise in the value of the foreign currencies and gold agaisnt the Indian rupee. That is why it has swelled to about 25% of the Forex and Gold Reserves.

In general, for India, the revaluation reserve will only keep rising. The rupee has a history of depreciation and for the right reasons. India is productivity and scale challenged. Hence, it is export-challenged and hence, it is current-account challenged.

Therefore, the risk that a sharp appreciation of the rupee will erode the value of the foreign currency assets that RBI holds and hence, it should be adjusted against the revaluation reserves is rather remote for the foreseeable future.

Revaluation reserves have reflected growing FX holdings – that is factually correct. Revaluation profits will keep occurring with a currency that is a ‘depreciating unit by default’. India’s revaluation reserves at about 26% of RBI’s Foreign Currency and Gold Reserves is too high.

Bank of Brazil’s revaluation reserves are a very tiny portion of its foreign exchange reserves. Indeed, Bank of Brazil’s overall equity (capital + reserves) is rather modest. [Link]

In contrast, Bank of Russia’s capital is nearly 37% of its balance sheet size! Bank of Russia does not give breakdown of its capital into capital and reserves.

People’s Bank of China Balance sheet for 2017 shows that the bank has far too tiny a capital base and no revaluation reserves.  The Chinese yuan does appreciate more often and in greater magnitude than the Indian rupee does. It has a huge cache of foreign exchange reserves which loses value whenever the yuan appreciates. Yet, they do not have revaluation reserves. See here.

So, the question arises as to why India has such a large revaluation reserve of around 26.2% of its total foreign assets (INR6916.41 billion against total foreign securities of INR7983.89 billion + INR18366.85 billion as of June 30, 2018). On top of this, there is a contingency reserve of INR2321.08 billion. [Link]

There is an interesting article in ‘India Express’ (ht Usha Thorat, former RBI Deputy Governor) published on November 19, 2018, written by P. Vaidyanatha Iyer:

In June 1994, while finalising its balance sheet, the RBI realised it was unable to provide for the exchange loss liability on account of a foreign currency deposit scheme offered by banks since 1975. …

The scheme was called the Foreign Currency Non-Repatriable Deposit Scheme, or FCNR-A, and was introduced to attract capital inflows and help finance deficit in the current account. Prodded by the government, banks offered interest rates higher than what they offered on local deposits. These deposits ballooned in the 1980s.

The RBI had agreed to provide exchange guarantee on these deposits. It didn’t think too much into the future then, and had a simple rationale: the dollars were added to foreign currency assets, these were revalued when the rupee depreciated, and so the revaluation gains would be available for meeting losses during repayment of principal. The interest to be paid on the FCNR-A deposits would be met through earnings on the dollars invested abroad.

But then, India was hit by a Balance of Payments crisis in the late 1980s. According to sources familiar with the developments then, the forex assets depleted fast and even the $1.1 billion of assets in 1991 represented dollars sold forward under a separate swap arrangement with State Bank of India. The losses from 1991 till 1994 were met by drawing from the Exchange Equalisation Account and the Contingency Reserve of the RBI. By 1994, both these reserves were fully depleted, and there was no source for providing for exchange losses on $10-billion worth dollar liabilities under the FCNR-A scheme.

The FCNR-A liabilities comprised $5 billion in principal and $5 billion in accrued interest. The average rate at which these dollars were bought was about Rs 16 a dollar. In 1994, the exchange rate was almost double at Rs 31.37, meaning the RBI had to bear a loss of Rs 15 more on every dollar. The total loss added up to Rs 1,500 crore. [Link]

Now, we understand the situations for which the revaluation reserves and contingency reserves were put to use, earlier.  But, since then, RBI does not offer exchange rate guarantees. Commercial banks bear the risk when they attract dollar deposits.

The ‘Usha Thorat Committee’ had recommended a total of 18% of assets for both revaluation reserves and contingency reserves. Actually, the denominators are slightly different. The ‘Currency and Gold Revaluation Reserve Account’ of 12-13% is calculated against foreign curency assets and gold holdings whereas the Contingency Reserve of 5% is on overall assets. Foreign currency assets constituted roughly 73% of total RBI assets as of June 30, 2018.

I understand from reliable sources that contingency reserves are held by the Reserve Bank of India for the following reasons:

  • when market intervention operations cost more than the anticipated;
  • for shortage in deposit insurance fund;
  • for any cyber security risk;
  • for ‘lender of last resort’ function and
  • if there is no transfer to GoI because of above contingencies, then it could affect fiscal math -hence some minimum profit transfer to GoI had to be assumed by RBI each year for better fiscal management by the Government

The Economic Survey of 2015-16 had recommended that total reserves be 16% of RBI assets, reduced from 32% (Box 1.6, Chapter 1, p. 19, Economic Survey 2015-16) and wanted the ‘excess reserve’ be used for bank recapitalisation. [Link]

So, even if the government fiscal math was behind the recent clamour for RBI’s ‘excess’ reserves, it is not unreasonable because the fiscal math was not undone by any reckless spending on the part of the government but because of the introduction of Goods and Services Tax, because of the failure of investment cycle to kick in, leading to higher economic activity and tax revenues, etc. Further, although bank recapitalisation charges were not reckoned with for fiscal deficit calculations, interest paid on the amounts would be added to the government expenditure.

Indian newspapers today have flagged a recent Bank of America – Merrill Lynch report which mention the excess reserves that RBI could potentially transfer to the Government of India. The report puts the figure between 1,00,000 crores of rupees and 3,00,000 crores of rupees (INR 1.0 trillion to INR3.0 trillion). See here.

So, there is a case for cooler heads and some transfer of excess reserves from the Reserve Bank of India to the Government of India.

How does RBI pay this to GoI?

My proposal is this:

Let a certain portion of the Revaluation Reserves be written back to the Income Statement every year, over 3 to 5 years. Then, it can be paid along with the profits for the year to GoI. To be sure, during this period, the revaluation reserves may increase if the rupee depreciates. Then, the duration may get lengthened. So, be it. Amortizing the payment to GoI over a period is the least-disruptive way to reduce the Revaluation Reserves from its current ‘excessive’ level to a comfortable level and also avoid the accusation that it is a short-term expedient for the present Government.

What about the other demands of the Government of India?

Ananth Narayan has neatly listed the government demands in his latest article in ‘Economic Times’:

  • The government wants the RBI to relax lending restrictions on the notionally weak banks that are under RBI’s Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework.
  • It wants RBI to provide forbearance (in other words, to close its eyes) on stressed loans, particularly to the power and micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) sectors.
  • It wants to access the capital on RBI’s balance sheet.
  • Finally, it wants the RBI to provide relief to stressed non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs).  [Link]

We have dealt with no. 3 in the list in this blog post.

On the other three demands, my suggestion is that the Government should bite its lips and not interfere with the central bank’s current stances. After all, they are the extension of the structural reforms that the Government itself had undertaken – willingly or otherwise.

It did demonetisation; it introduced the Goods and Services Tax; it enacted the Insolvency and Bankruptcy code and it passed the Real Estate Regulation Act. All these mean discontinuity with the status quo that had prevailed for the previous sixty-seven years. Similarly, regulatory forbearance has been the practice of the previous sixty-seven years. In these areas, RBI is wanting to signal a change. It is welcome. It is painful in the short-term. The government has to bite its lips and face the short-term growth disruption and the complaints of its core constituencies who might be affected.

To offset the political damage, the government must take the case to the people, as it did in the case of demonetisation. It must market itself as the champion of long-term structural reforms for the good of the nation, sacrificing its own personal and political interests in the short-term for the good of the nation.

Not easy but do-able. 

What should RBI do on its part?

It must come off its high horse and admit to failings in its regulatory architecture and practice. It should listen to Indira Rajaraman. As Dr. Y.V. Reddy said in a speech in February, it must come out with a white paper on non-performing assets, detailing its own failings. It must accept to regulatory shortcomings with respect to detecting frauds such as the one that happened in Punjab National Bank. The case of IL&FS highlighted failures in the regulation of non-banking finance corporations. It must be candid; admit to its inadequacies and failures, resolve to address them and outline steps it will be taking to do so, with clear timelines. It must report to the public on the progress of the redressal measures and close them within a reasonabel time-frame. 

As importantly, it must use the opportunity to address consumer issues as highlighted by Debashis Basu in this article in ‘Business Standard’ recently.

Of golden ages and worst economic managements

On Nov. 19, the RBI Board met. RBI put out a press release. A committee is to be formed to evaluate the adequate level of revaluation and contingency reserves that RBI could hold. It is now possible to analyse the issues dispassinately. Which means we don’t write stuff like this:

Will it now reverse the equally long trend towards genuine RBI independence? If so, this government will cement its reputation as providing the worst economic management India has had for decades. [Link] – ht Chris Wood of CLSA

The author of those sentences – Mihir Sharma – is also famous for lamenting that a golden age had ended when the UPA government demitted office in 2014. See here.

Obviously, his economics education has given him different benchmarks to rate economic performance. Sustained double-digit inflation for five to six years, rising fiscal and current account deficits, tumbling currency, retrospective tax amendments, quiet to blatant interference with the central bank and taxing start-ups’ share premium as income, falling capital investment rates, rising (eventually gigantic) non-performing assets in the banking system, corrupt allocation of natural resources that had to be cancelled and many more constitute golden era of economic management!

Low inflation, low current account deficit, steady economic growth, transparent auctioning of natural resources, pick-up in public investment, rising share of direct taxes in overall tax take, rising tax buoyancy, a successful financial inclusion initiative (PMJDY), scheme to restructure losses of the state electricity boards and for the States to reckon the explicit fiscal costs of their electricity subsidy, introduction of the nation-wide Goods and Services Tax, introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, introduction of the Real Estate Regulation Act, explict push to have big corporations pay their dues to supplies from small and medium enterprises, labour law reforms in BJP-ruled States, improvement in ‘Ease of Doing Business’ by focusing on key bottlenecks constitute worst economic management!

He writes that this government failed to take advantage of lower oil prices. He is right. It did not, because it had to use the oil price crash bonanza to fix the true federal government fiscal deficit of upwards of 6.0% of GDP that the UPA government had bequeathed. The mid-year economic report of the Department of Economic Affairs published in December 2014 has a special box on the pro-cyclical fiscal consolidation that the then recently installed NDA government had to do.

So, it is true that it did not take advantage of the oil price crash and pass on the bonanza to the economy. It chose to put the fiscal house in order and its mistake was in not publishing a white paper on the economy it inherited from its predecessor.

I am sure Indians are smarter to choose more wisely than him.

Is it really the spine issue?

A detailed examination (ht Aru Arumugam) of the independence (or, the lack thereof) of Directors on corporate boards in India. Worth a read.

The problem is that most independent directors view the directorship as a favour conferred on them by the management. Two, they really do not spend that much time on the inner workings of the company. It is almost impossible to detect frauds with the level of engagement they have. Three, if they have to do a thorough job of it, they need to be full-time, in which case the compensations they earn as independent Directors are simply too meagre to require extensive time commitment.  Four, therefore, the requirements of the law on independent Directors on the Boards of publictly listed companies are disproportionately too onerous.

So, what will happen is that honest, sincere and competent individuals will stay away, defeating the very purpose and intent of the laws. Talk of unintended consequences, yet again!

A (t)horny issue and other links

The Swiss sure have their problems!! The rest of us will only be too happy to trade ours for theirs. Referendum on cows’ horns is coming up in Switzerland! [Link]

Augustin Carstens called the bitcoin ‘a bubble, Ponzi scheme and an environmental disaster’ way back in February. Well said [Link]. The value of bitcoin has collapsed and I suspect that the benefits of ‘Blockchain’ are vastly overstated.

Paul Tudor Jones sounds the alarm on corporate credit in the United States:

If you go across the landscape you have levels of leverage that probably aren’t sustainable and could be systemically threatening if we don’t have . . . appropriate responses [Link]

IMF had chipped in with its own (eloquent, doubtless) warning on leveraged loans, little realising its own culpability on the matter. It warned central banks against raising rates ‘prematurely’ from 0.0%. The truth was that in 2015-16 the world was in dire straits. Hence, their warnings, perhaps, on premature tightening. But, then, it means that the programme of zero short-term interest rates and QE (which held down long-term rates) were a failure. Why persist with them? So, they created the mess that they are warning against now!

The many errors of C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh

This morning, I went through the article by C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh in ‘BusinessLine’. They make many erroneous claims in the article.

(1) They point out that India’s wealth Gini coefficient was 85.4% as per the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report, 2018 released in October. That is true. They forget to point out that Sweden’s was higher at 86.5%!  Sweden’s was at 83.4 last year while India’s was at 83.0! Pakistan’s Gini coefficient for wealth was a shockingly low 52.6% last year and 65.0% this year. That would be clearly unexpected and one needs to look at data issues.

(2) They write:

The top decile increased its share of estimated wealth from 70 per cent in 2000 to nearly 82 per cent in 2016, and since then its share has fallen only marginally to 77.4 per cent in 2018

I am not sure Credit Suisse Wealth Report published data on the wealth share of the top 10% for the year 2000. I could not find it. Does not mean that they are wrong but their source could be different.

Credit Suisse data tell me that the share of wealth of the top 10% was 68.8% in 2010; it rose to 74.0% by 2014, it had risen to 80.7% by 2016 and had declined to 73.3% by 2017 (Effect of demonetisation?). This year had it jumped to 77.4% (data as of mid-2018, according to Credit Suisse).

(3) They take similar liberties with the data on the wealth share of the top 1%. They write:

Meanwhile the trend in the share of the top 1 percentile is even more shocking: from 39 per cent to as much as 58.4 per cent in 2016, going down since then (largely because of changes in stock market valuations etc.) to around 52 per cent.

It went from 40.3% in 2010 to 49.0% by 2014, had increased to 58.4% in 2016 (that part is true) but had dropped to 45.1% by 2017 (again, demonetisation effect?). It had gone back above 50% (to 51.5%) as of 2018 report.

Data for specific years will be influenced by the exchange rate of the Indian rupee vs. US dollar and by the performance of the stock market. Overall, the rising trend in the wealth share of top 1%, 5% and 10% is clearly established. But, cherrypicking the data to depict the present government in bad light is not rigorous research.

(4) Coming to income-tax matters, they write:

As it is, only around 1.7 per cent of the Indian population pay income tax.

I am dumbfounded.  Number of taxpayers is 74,127,250 as per the latest time-series data produced by the Income-Tax department. India’s population is around 134 crores. This number is 7.4 crores. Do the math! That is 5.5%. Further, the number 1.7% ignores the fact that nearly half the population that lives in rural India and relies on agricultural income, which is exempt from tax.

(5) They write:

The inability to tax high net worth individuals — or to collect corporation tax from profitable companies as expected — in turn means that the government has turned to relying more and more on indirect taxation.

That is not quite true. The direct tax/GDP ratio reached a peak of 6.3% in 2007-08 and it dropped to a low of 5.48% in 2011-12 (the lowest in recent time was 5.47% in 2015-16) but in the last two years, it has climbed nicely to 5.98%. See table 1.4 here.

(6) They write:

The share of direct taxes in total tax revenues has fallen from 38 per cent in 2009-10 (under the currently much-maligned UPA government) to only 32 per cent in 2017-18.

The share of direct taxes in total tax revenue was as high as 60.78% in 2009-10 and it dropped to 49.65% in 2016-17. It had since risen to 52.29% in 2017-18. Both numbers appear way off the mark. See table 1.3 here.

Now, let us ask why the UPA was ‘much maligned’?

(a) Annual percentage change in the official consumer price index (commonly but mistakenly referred to as ‘inflation) was in double digits for five years from 2009-10 to 2013-14.

(b) Fiscal deficit ratio shot up and so did the current account deficit;

(c) The external value of the Indian currency plunged big time in 2012-13 and in 2013-14

(d) The big farm loan waiver announced in December 2007 permanently damaged loan repayment culture and the fiscal balance. It has evidently not helped farmers. It has merely spawned many more loan waivers.

(e) Multitudinous corruption scandals

(f) Lastly and the most important, in line with the theme of the article by C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh,

(i) the median wealth of Indians dropped to USD1016 in 2014 from USD1217 in 2010. It had since gone up to USD1289 as of mid-2018.

(ii) The wealth of the top 1% of Indians rose at a Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 6.77% from 2010 to 2014 while that of the bottom 90% shrank at a rate of 2.85% CAGR in the same period. From 2014 to mid-2018, the wealth of the top 1% has grown at a CAGR of 8.48% while that of the bottom 90% has grown at a rate of 3.45%

As I had said earlier in this post, there is clearly a worsening trend of inequality in India both with respect to income and wealth. But, I do clearly believe that the ‘much-maligned’ demonetisation, the introduction of GST and that of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code contain, in them, the seeds of change and reversal of the trend of worsening inequality over time.

Quality of public debate and public policy depend on rigorous analysis and reliable data.